Howard Margolis, a senior lecturer with the Committee on Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago, adds cognition to the necessary ingredients to explain public behavior. A theme of the book is that rulefollowing processes "must be reduced pattern recognition, not the reverse" (p. 4). That is, interests plus logic are not sufficient to account for judgment; P-cognition, or the mechanisms involved in pattern recognition, also plays a role. Needless to say, I was impressed that a person within the perspective of the political sciences would arrive at an interpretation similar to one that has emerged in experimental psychology. Of course, Margolis is not the first to claim that pattern recognition is central to thinking. Loosely speaking, the Gestalt psychologists must have had a similar notion in mind, as have investigators in more current studies of game playing, medical diagnosis, and language processing.
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If pattern recognition is central to thinking, then complex behavior can be understood in terms of the information available to the thinker and how that information is processed. This perspective of information and information processing, can account for apparent leaps in understanding throughout history. In scientific inquiry, for example, some "revolutionary" contribution could result from the patterns and cues available to the revolutionary scientist.
Entering the debate over rationality, Margolis argues against analyzing irrational choice in terms of two processes: a framing stage and a judgment stage. Other defenders of rationality see apparent nonoptimal behavior as a breakdown in the first stage, but never in the second stage. But, in fact, Margolis seems to side with interpretations at the level of framing when he applies P-cognition: "An anomalous response will most always in fact be a reasonably logical response to another question .. ., and in particular to a question that means something in the life experience of the individual giving the response" (p. 6).
The goal is to provide an account of illogical judgment within the same theory that accounts for logical judgment. He begins with a discussion of illusions, and makes a distinction between those capable of being corrected and those immune to correction. This distinction does not appear to be critical for his arguments. Why are individuals vulnerable to an illusion, even if they know everything there is to know about the illusion? This phenomenon relates to the idea of different levels of information being held in parallel. What is nice about this conjecture is that it follows from the independence of different sources of information. Contrary to the prototypical information-processing view, information transformed from one stage to another remains relatively intact at the earlier stage.
Margolis uses perceptual illusions as an entry into cognitive illusions. The basic building block of P-cognition is "jumping"-arriving at an interpretation of a pattern based on a partial processing of the cues. This theme is admirably demonstrated by the illustration on the book's jacket cover, which represents an invitation to the viewer to "find the hidden man" (Figure 1 Selfridge's (1959) pandemonium is used to illustrate the groundwork of P-cognition, and a curve-fitting model is used an an analogy to show how an interpretation is imposed on the data. The two forms of curve fitting used are "stepwise regression" and factor analysis. Throughout the book, the author stresses that his categories of explanation are fuzzily defined with no sharp lines between the categories. An important distinction is intuitive "seeing-that" versus analytical "reasoning-why." Reasoning-why might entail including additional sources of information or increased scrutiny of some of the sources. Perception and action might be said to entail a continuum from immediate holistic pattern recognition to critical analytical recognition. What goes on in the head is not formal logic, but the latter can provide an account of the former in the sense of formal normative models providing sufficient descriptions of performance. A good example is the multiple uses in language of the word or, as opposed to its single use in logic. Contrary to Fodor (1983) The author distinguishes between semantic and scenario effects. The former puts the ambiguity immediately in the language of the problem and the latter in the real-world context engaged by the problem. He provides convincing interpretations of the four-card selection task by finding realworld situations that would justify any of the possible selections. According to Margolis, the subject simply generates a real-world interpretation of a general question. Unfortunately, given the multiplicity of interpretations, the author's hypothesis has no predictive power.
The conjunction fallacy has captured the imagination of many cognitive scientists, Margolis among them. Subjects are given a description of a hypothetical person named Linda:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She had a double major in philosophy and music. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.
Subjects are then asked to indicate how likely is the case that Linda is a bank teller. In addition, subjects are asked to indicate how likely is the case that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist. A majority of subjects claim that the second case is more likely than the first, committing what Tversky and Kahneman (1983) labeled a conjunction fallacy.
Margolis stresses the ambiguity of the scenario established by the Linda problem. He focuses on the word probable and its two senses or meanings. There is probability in the gambling sense (most appropriately equated with probability theory). There is also probability that is synonymous with believable or plausible. The latter would seem to be best equated with making decisions about the world around us based on ambiguous information. To instantiate the use of the gambling sense of probability, Margolis (p. 166) suggests modifying the Linda problem by adding the following warning along with a rephrasing of the question.
A personnel survey showed that of clerical workers in banks (including tellers) fewer than 1 % have personality profiles that sound similar to Linda's. If you stood to win $10 if the statement you choose turns out to be true (whether or not the other statement is also true), which choice is more likely to win you the $10? Supposedly, this reformulation of the question will not lead to a conjunction fallacy (although no actual results are presented). The important feature, according to Margolis, is attaching the word likely to winning the prize rather than to the actual choices. Evidently, by attaching the word likely to the choices, the believable meaning of likely (or probability) is engaged and, hence, a conjunction fallacy occurs. That is, asking subjects about the probability of the choices directly is equivalent to asking them about similarity (as Tversky and Kahneman, 1983, did in their original study). According to Margolis, a subject's choices in the Linda problem make sense when they make judgments on the basis of believability, plausibility, or similarity. Tversky and Kahneman would agree with this. Margolis would claim that asking about probability in the manner of Tversky and Kahneman is interpreted in the same manner. By enforcing an interpretation in terms of the gambling sense of probability, a conjunction fallacy is avoided.
Margolis does not end with esoteric problems from the psychologist's laboratory. The final third of the book extends his analysis to the discoveries of Darwin and Copernicus and the political maneuvers of Galileo. Margolis describes very convincingly how the belief in discrete categories of species impeded an acceptance of evolutionary theory within the field of biology. In addition, an important contribution to Darwin's development of the theory was Lyell's geology. The current marvels of nature can be described by long-term processes of continuous and gradual change over time. Animals and plants might reflect analogous processes; the "unique" individuals currently inhabiting the earth represent the gradual evolution resulting from local, gradual, and continuous processes (without any grand design or designer).
An interesting extension of the author's analysis is the development of an explanation of public societal consciousness that parallels his explanation of individual performance. There are no sharp boundaries between copying and discovery, and between familiar and novel situations. Chance plays an important role in discovery. Scientists find it comfortable and reasonable to work within opposing paradigms depending on the immediate goals. For example, geneticists can utilize either Mendelian or molecular genetics. To do so, a gestalt shift is needed to switch from one paradigm to the other. In summary, this ambitious book should be among the armament of cognitive psychologists interested in thought and its consequences in the real world past and present. 
